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CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


ID 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  Institut  Canadian  da  microraproductions  historiques 


1980 


Technical  Notes  /  Notes  techniques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best 
original  copy  available  for  filming.  Physical 
features  of  this  copy  which  may  alter  any  of  the 
images  in  the  reproduction  are  checked  below. 


n 
n 


Coloured  covers/ 
Couvertures  de  couleur 


Coloured  maps/ 

Cartes  g^ographiques  en  couleur 


Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed/ 
Pages  dicolories,  tachet^es  ou  piquAes 


Tight  binding  (may  cause  shadows  or 
distortion  along  interior  margin)/ 
Reliure  serr4  (peut  causer  de  I'ombre  ou 
de  la  distortion  le  long  de  la  marge 
intdrieure) 


L'Institut  a  microfilm^  le  mellleur  exemplaire 
qu'il  iui  a  AtA  possible  de  se  procurer.  Certains 
difauts  susceptibles  de  nuire  A  la  qualitd  de  la 
reproduction  sont  notte  ci-dessous. 


n 


Coloured  pages/ 
Pages  de  couleur 


Coloured  plates/ 
Planches  en  couleur 


Show  through/ 
Transparence 


Pages  damaged/ 
Pages  endommagAes 


Th 
po 
of 
fill 


Th 

CO 

or 
ap 

Th 
fill 
iru 


Ml 

in 

up 

bo 

fol 


D 


Additional  comments/ 
Commentaires  suppldmentaires 


Bibliographic  Notes  /  Notes  bibliographiques 


n 


Only  edition  available/ 
Seule  Edition  disponibie 


Bound  with  other  material/ 
Reli6  avec  d'autres  documents 


Cover  title  missing/ 

Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 


Plates  missing/ 

Des  planches  manquent 


n 


Pagination  incorrect/ 
Erreurs  de  pagination 


Pages  missing/ 
Des  pages  manquent 


IMaps  missing/ 

Des  cartes  g^ographiques  manquent 


D 


Additional  comments/ 
Commentaires  suppl6mentaires 


Th«  imag«s  appearing  hare  ara  tha  baat  quality 
poasibia  conaidaring  tha  condition  and  lagibility 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  kaaping  with  tha 
filming  contract  apacificationa. 


Tha  laat  racordad  frania  on  aach  microficha  shall 
contain  tha  symbol  — »>  (maaning  CONTINUED"), 
or  tha  symbol  V  (maaning  "END"),  whichavar 
applies. 


Las  imagas  suivantas  ont  AtA  raproduitas  avac  la 
plus  grand  soin,  compta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattatA  da  I'axamplaira  filmA,  at  an 
conformity  avac  laa  conditions  du  contrat  da 
filmaga. 

Un  daa  symbolas  suivants  apparattra  sur  la  dr>r- 
niAra  imaga  da  chaqua  microficha,  salon  la  cas: 
la  symbols  — ►  signifia  "A  SUIVRE",  la  symbols 
y  signifia  "FIN". 


Tha  origirtal  copy  wvas  borrowed  from,  and 
filmed  with,  ttia  kind  consent  of  the  following 
institution: 

National  Library  of  Canada 


L'axemplaira  film6  fut  reproduit  grice  A  la 
ginirositA  da  rAtablissement  prAteur 
suivant  : 

BibliothAqua  nationale  du  Canada 


Maps  or  plates  too  large  to  be  entirely  included 
in  one  exposurr  are  filmed  beginning  in  the 
upper  l«ft  hand  corner,  left  to  right  and  top  to 
bottom,  as  many  frames  as  required.  The 
following  diagrams  illustrate  the  method: 


Les  cartes  ou  les  planches  trop  grandes  pour  Atre 
reproduites  en  un  seul  cliche  sont  filmtis  A 
partir  da  Tangle  supArieure  gauche,  de  gauche  A 
droite  et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  la  nombre 
d'images  nAcessaire.  La  diagramme  suivant 
illuatre  la  mAthoda  : 


1  2  3 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

Suyplus  Revenue  and  Canadian  Relations. 


) 


/ 


i 


Philadelphia,  Nm^emher  28,  1887. 
Hon.  Justin  S.  Morrill, 

Chairman  Finance  Committee,  United  States  Senate ; 

Dear  Sir: 

During  the  last  ten  years  I  have  had  the  honor 
of  addressing  you  upon  questions  of  pubhc  interest, — national 
revenue  reduction,  and  reciprocity  treaties  with  Mexico  and 
Spain, — and  I  now  venture  to  offer  for  consideration  and  dis- 
cussion a  memorandum  on  the  National  Revenues  and  their 
Surplus,  and  the  adjustment  of  our  Trade  Relations  with 
Canada,  which  has  been  prepared  under  my  direction.  The 
distribution  of  the  national  surplus  revenue  has  long  seemed  to 
me  a  proper  measure  of  relief  for  the  burdens  of  local  taxation, 
and  the  only  measure  that  would  make  sure  the  maintenance 
of  the  American  system  of  Protection.  In  June,  1883,  in  a 
letter  to  the  Honorable  Charles  J.  Folger,  then  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  I  urged  the  view  that  "  reconstructing  the  tax 
s\stem  of  the  country,  reforming  its  old  abuses  and  absurdities. 


relieving  the  local  1:ax  burdens  of  the  people,  and  preserving 
intact,  by  a  harnionious  method  of  adequate  import  duties,  the 
protection  of  American  labor"  was  of  more  importance  than 
any  other  ciuestion   of  American  affairs. 

On  July  II,  1883,  the  Republican  State  Convention 
of   Pennsylvania  ac'opted   resolutions  as  follows : 

"  First.  We  unqualifiedly  approve  and  demand  the  continuance  of 
that  system  of  Protection  to  Home  Industry  which  has  proved  itself  to 
be  the  basis  of  national  independence,  the  incentive  to  industrial  skill 
and  development,  and  the  guarantee  of  a  just  and  adequate  scale  of 
wages  for  labor ;  and  we  denounce  all  attempts  to  reduce  the  rates  of 
the  tariff  below  the  level  which  will  accomplish  these  objects. 

"Second.  That  ;iny  surplus  in  the  public  treasury  arising  from  a 
redundant  revenue  should,  after  paying  the  national  debt  as  fast  as  its 
conditions  permit,  he  distributed  from  time  to  time  to  the  several  States 
upon  the  basis  of  population,  to  relieve  them  from  the  burdens  of  local 
taxation  and  provide  means  for  the  education  of  their  people." 

These  resolutions  were  adopted  with  the  knowledge  that 
President  Arthur  was  prepared  to  make  the  Presidential  cam- 
paign upon  this  platforin. 

In  December,  1879,  I  embodied  in  the  form  of  an  open 
letter  addressed  I.0  General  Garfield  arguments  in  favor  of 
Commercial  Unio  1  with  Canada,  but  only  after  those  views  had 
received  the  appnnal  of  that  distinguished  statesman.  I  have 
reason  to  know  tliat,  had  President  Garfield  lived  another  year, 
he  would  have  advocated  this  .settlement  of  Canadian  questions, 
and  that  he  woild  have  opposed  all  other  solutions.  After 
watching  the  discussion  of  the  Canadian  complications,  and  of 
national  finance,  I  am  convinced  that  the  only  American 
.solution  of  them  is  upon  these  lines, — and  therefore  the  publica- 
tion of  this  memorandum. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be, 

Very  respectfully  yours, 

Wharton  B.vkkek. 


MEMORAND  UM 

-  ■  'PON— 

I..    The  National  Revenues  and  their  Surplus : 
II.     Trade  Relations  of  the  United  States  and 
Canada. 


''IPVVO  subjects  of  high  importance  demand  consideration  at 
the  hands  of  the  American  people  and  their  Congress 
These  are : 

I.  The  problem  of  the  National  Revenues  and  their 
Surplus. 

II.  The  adjustment  of  our  Trade  Relations  with  the 
Dominion  of  Canada. 

The  purpose  of  this  memorandum  is  to  present  some  of 
the  facts  which  must  govern  a  sound  public  judgment  in  re- 
lation to  these  subjects ;  and  to  point  out  the  reasons  for 
believing : 

1.  That  the  revenues  collected  into  the  treasury  at  Wash- 
ingt;Dn,  now  temporarily  exceeding  the  strictly  defined  uses  of 
the  federal  government,  should  rather  be  applied,  to  the  extent 
of  the  excess,  in  the  relief  of  other  public  burdens  resting  upon 
the  r>tates,  than  be  hastily  and  hurtfully  diminished. 

2.  That  the  adjustment  of  the  commercial  relations  of 
the  United  States  and  Canada  should  be  made,  not  by  means 
of  a  jDartial  reciprocity  of  trade,  or  a  ne'/  form  of  bargaining 
over  the  fisheries,  but  by  an  agreement  between  the  two 
countries  to  maintain  an  equal  tariff  rate  against  all  other 
nations,  and  to  trade  unrestrictedly  with  each  other,  dividing 
the  revenues  received  at  the  custom  houses  of  the  two  coun- 
tries, according  to  their  respective  populations. 


T^HE  subject  of  the  national  finances,  always  of  high  impor- 
tance, under  existing  circumstances  is  both  urgent  and 
serious.  The  financial  and  economic  policy  of  the  country, 
maintained  during  twenty-five  years,  has  had  the  remarkable 
result  of  producing  a  national  revenue  much  greater  than  the 
ordinary  national  uses.  It  is  true  that  a  great  national  debt 
remains  in  part  unpaid;  but  it  is  also  true  (i)  that  none  of  it  is 
due;  and  (2)  that  the  lenders  stand  upon  their  rights,  under  the 
contract  of  the  loan,  to  decline  present  payment.  This  use, 
therefore,  which  had  heretofore  absorbed  the  surplus,  has  now 
ceased.  For  an  interval  of  four  years  no  more  of  the  principal 
of  the  debt  can  be  reached. 

The  surplus  is  thus  the  overshadowing  fact  of  the  situation. 
Its  existence  is  not  to  be  denied.  Its  amount  is  substantially 
the  round  sum  of  a  hundred  millions  of  dollars  a  year.  The 
question  is.  How  shall  we  deal  with  it  ? 

The  reply  to  this  question,  if  wise,  will  proceed  from  a 
thorough  and  unprejudiced  survey  of  the  whole  case.  The 
present  fiscal  problem  of  the  United  States  is  not  such  as  the 
experience  of  other  nations  has  presented :  it  calls,  therefore,  for 
a  treatment  at  once  practical  and  original,  uncontrolled  by  pre- 
conceived notions,  or  narrow  theories  of  finance.  It  is  an 
American  question.  In  approaching  it,  three  general  conditions 
of  fact  present  themselves.     These  are : 

1.  The  Surplus,  if  usefully  expended,  is  no  burden.  While 
its  hoarding  is  an  evil,  the  avoidance  of  this  by  its  prompt 
return  to  the  channels  of  business  presents  no  difficulty. 

2.  The  revenues  whose  excess  produce  the  surplus  are  so 
derived,  for  the  most  part,  that  the  public  interest  is  benefited 
by  their  continuance. 

3.  The  national  debt  being  yet  unpaid,  to  the  amount  of  nearly 
a  thouc,and  millions  of  dollars,  the  Surplus  will  again  be  needed, 
as  scon  as  the  debt  can  be  again  reached.  It  is  not  with  a 
nation  free  of  debt,  and  a  surplus  never  again  to  be  useful,  that 
we  have  to  deal,  but  with  an  intcri'al  simply,  in  which  the  ex- 
cess revenue  is  not  usable  for  national  purposes. 

4 


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Taking  up  these  statements  in  detail,  there  can  hardly  be  a 
difference  of  view  as  to  the  first  or  third.  It  will  be  conceded, 
certainly,  that  while  the  hoarding  of  money  in  the  treasury  vaults  is 
an  intolerable  disturbance  of  the  country's  business,  the  avoidance 
of  this  by  its  punctual  outpayment,  /or  a  good  use,  is  a  process 
beyond  criticism.  And  that  the  nation  is  still  deeply  in  debt, 
and  may  again  resume  the  redemption  of  its  bonds  in  1 891,  is 
known  to  all. 

Considering,  then,  the  second  statement :  The  customs  rev- 
enues are  derived  from  duties  mostly  protective.  If — as  is  the 
ground  assumed  in  this  memorandum — the  policy  of  Protection 
to  our  home  production  and  markets  is  wise,  then  the  revenues 
proceeding  from  such  duties  as  that  policy  demand  are  not  to 
be  abolished ;  nor  is  their  maintenance  in  any  degree  harmful. 
Their  repeal,  so  far  from  being  a  relief  to  the  American  tax- 
payer, would  increase  the  burden  laid  upon  him  and  diminish 
his  ability  to  support  it.  And  while  it  is  true  that  there  may 
be  some  revenues  derived  from  the  Tariff"  which  are  not  now 
serving  any  protective  purpose,  it  is  a  fact  that  careful  analysis 
of  these  shows  that,  exclusive  of  the  sugar  duty,  to  which 
reference  will  be  separately  made,  they  do  not  exceed  twelve 
millions  of  dollars.  Their  entire  repeal,  and  the  transfer  of  the 
articles  they  represent  to  the  "  free  list,"  would  affect  to  an  in- 
considerable extent  the  accumulation  of  the  annual  Surplus. 

If  we  pronounce  the  protective  duties  beneficial,  and  the 
revenues  from  them  no  burden,  but  the  logical  consequence  of  the 
national  advantage  which  Protection  seeks,  how,  then,  is  it  with 
the  taxation  of  the  Internal  Revenue  system  ?  This  falls  upon 
two  things,  and  two  things  only — intoxicant  liquors  and 
tobacco.  Can  it  be  seriously  represented  that  such  taxes  are  a 
hardship  ?  Or,  speaking  of  the  former  only,  will  it  be  any- 
where held  that  the  levy  of  a  charge  fo  ublic  use  upon  whisky 
and  beer  is  a  public  injury?  Turning  to  the  purely  financial 
aspect  of  the  question,  it  appears  that  the  total,  repeal  of  the 
internal  revenue  taxes  would  more  than  dispose  of  the  Surplus  ; 
according  to  the  experience  of  recent   years,  their  average 


amount  has  much  exceeded  the  average  annual  reduction 
of  the  debt.*  Unless,  then,  we  desire  to  create  a  deficit  in  the 
Treasury,  the  entire  repeal  of  the  internal  taxes  is  impossible, 
and  the  system  must,  in  part,  at  least,  be  continued. 

In  fact,  the  taxes  of  the  Internal  Bureau  arc  a  marvel  of 
cheap,  easy,  and  punctual  collection,  simple  and  orderly  ar- 
rangement, and  complete  absence  from  public  inconvenience. 
They  are  unfelt,  and  when  observed  at  all,  are  found  to 
entail  no  hardship.  That  they  increase  the  cost,  and  so  far  dis- 
courage the  use,  of  intoxicating  drink,  is  a  benefit  To  repeal 
the  tax  on  this,  and  surrender  the  revenue  to  the  dealers  in  and 
consumers  of  liquors,  while  useful  property,  lands  and  houses, 
goods  and  chattels,  must  continue  to  be  taxed,  would  be  a 
lamentable  yielding  of  common  sense  to  narrow  and  arbitrary 
ideas  of  finance,  and  a  sacrifice  equally  lamentable  of  the  oppor- 
tunity of  establishing  a  tax  reform,  national  and  local,  which 
would  afford  great  and  lasting  benefit  to  the  country. 

As  to  the  second  statement  above,  it  appears,  then :  ( i ) 
That  the  revenues  from  customs  duties,  so  far  as  those  duties  are 
protective,  ought  not  to  be  disturbed.  (2.)  That  the  repeal  of 
those  not  now  strictly  protective,  exclusive  of  the  sugar  duty, 
may  afford  a  reduction  of  ten  to  twelve  per  cent,  of  the 
annual  Surplus.  (3.)  That  the  removal  of  the  ts.x  on  liquors  is 
not  suggested  by  sound  reason,  and  would  be  a  hurt,  rather 
than  a  benefit.  (4.)  That  the  entire  revenue  from  the  Internal 
System  cannot  be  dispensed  with,  if  the  Treasury  is  to  continue 
to  meet  its  obligations. 

•  The  following  table  exhibits  this  in  detail : 

Year.  Receipts  Int.  Revenue.  Reduction  of  Debt. 

1880 $124,009,373 173,650,600 

1881 13S.264.385 84.425.350 

1882 146,497,505 175.757.350 

1883 144,720,368 125.581,250 

1884 121,586,672 111,665,300 

1885 112,498,725 30.412,900 

1886 116,805,936 50,136,850 


Total,  7  years  .    . 
Average,  7  years 


•  5901.382,964 1659,629,600 

.1128,768,994 193,089,942 

6 


(I. 


Taking  up  the  two  revenues  upon  which  a  suspension  of 
judgment  has  been  intimated,  that  from  the  import  of  sugar, 
and  that  upon  the  domestic  production  of  tobacco,  we  are  con- 
fronted as  to  the  former  by  the  fact  that  it  is  not  a  protective 
but  a  revenue  duty.  Taking  the  experience  of  thirty-five  years, 
it  appears  that  not  only  has  this  protection  failed  to  create  a  suf- 
ficient home  supply  of  sugar,  but  it  has  even  failed  to  maintain 
the  product  i. '  the  amount  of  1852.  In  that  year  (1852-3), 
the  product  of  sugar  in  the  United  States  was  386^  millions 
of  pounds,  and  in  the  following  year  it  was  525  millions, 
whereas  the  average  product  for  ten  years  past  (1876-7  to 
1885-6  inclusive),  has  been  but  251^  millions  of  pounds, — this 
absolute  diminution  being,  of  course,  immensely  greater  rela- 
tively, when  the  increase  in  the  sugar  consumption  of  the 
country  is  considered.  In  ten  years  (1877  to  1886),  our  con- 
sumption has  risen  from  745,250  tons  a  year,  or  36  pounds  per 
capita,  \o  1,389,  125  tons,  or  53.3  pounds /<r  £•«///«,  and  of  this 
quantity  our  home  product  now  figures  as  about  one-tenth  only. 

It  is  perfectly  plain  that  so  far  as  the  cane  is  concerned,  a 
home  supply  of  sugar  cannot  be  got  through  any  influence  of 
protective  duties  laid  upon  imported  sugars ;  it  is  also  true, 
indeed,  but  not  necessary  here  to  consider,  thai  such  a  supply 
cannot  be  grown  at  all  in  this  country,  from  the  cane.  The 
sugar  duty  is  therefore  not  now  one  of  Protection,  It  has  not 
produced,  within  a  period  more  than  ample  for  the  test,  the  re- 
sult which  Protection  calls  for :  the  establishment  and  mainten- 
ance of  an  adequate  home  supply.  The  retention  of  the  duty  is 
therefore  not  justified  by  any  protective  principle,  and  the  reten- 
tion of  the  return  from  it  has  become  a  revenue  question,  quali- 
fied only,  as  to  the  future,  by  such  prospect  as  we  may  believe 
to  exist  of  the  development  of  the  sorghum  sugar  manufacture, 
and  such  reasonable  obligation  as  there  may  be  not  to  abandon 
the  cane  industry  of  Louisiana. 

Three  sources  of  revenue  are  thus  indicated  as  perhaps 
available  for  reduction :  Placing  on  the  "free  list"  those  im- 
ports whose  duty  charges  now  serve  no  protective  purpose 


may  cut  off  ten  millions  of  dollars.  The  repeal  of  the  internal 
tax  on  home-grown  tobacco  would  take  off  about  twenty-eight 
millions.  The  entire  repeal  of  the  sugar  duty,  coupled  with  the 
payment  of,  say,  five  millions  bounty  to  develop  the  sorghum 
manufacture  and  preserve  the  Lx>uisiana  industry,  would  affect  the 
revenues  fifty-five  millions  more.  Altogether,  this,  making 
ninety-three  millions,  would  substantially  efface  the  Surplus. 

But  let  us  stop  here  to  consider  that  if  we  thus  cut  off  all 
excess  of  revenue,  now,  even  though  it  be  >ne  in  the  least 
hurtful  way,  we  shall  probably  have  no  surpjus  with  which  to 
resume  the  debt  payment,  in  1891,  Do  we  consent  to  this  ? 
Do  we  desire  to  make  the  debt  permanent?  If  not,  then  shall 
not  the  Surplus  be  preserved,  in  part  or  entirely,  during  the 
four  years'  interval,  and  be  applied  for  the  time  to  the  payment 
of  debts  and  the  relief  of  taxes  resting  upon  the  shoulders  of 
precisely  the  same  people  as  those  who  owe  the  national  debt  ? 

Whether  we  wish  it  or  not,  to  this  issue  the  subject  of  the 
Revenues  and  their  Sur|)lus  leads.  In  the  nature  of  the  case, 
this  form  of  the  question  cannot  be  avoided.  We  are  obliged 
to  consider  whether  it  is  the  best  policy  to  cut  off  revenues 
which  impose  no  burden  upon  the  country,  while  we  choo.se, 
upon  technical  and  conventional  grounds,  to  continue  the  col- 
lection of  other  revenues  which  do  burden  the  country.  The 
problem,  it  is  true,  is  novel,  but  it  none  the  less  deserves  a 
candid  and  unprejudiced  treatment,  and  its  best  solution  will  be 
that  which  is  according  to  the  simplest  rules  of  common  sense 
and  of  our  own  American  experience. 

The  policy  of  establishing  a  systematic  and  continuous 
relation  of  support  from  the  common  treasury  of  the  United 
States  to  those  of  the  separate  States  is  suggested  by  this 
situation.  Such  an  arrangement  would  be  justified  by  the 
constitutional  proportion  of  powers  and  functions  give."!  to  the 
Union,  and  to  its  members  ;  by  two  great  precedents  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  country;  and  by  the  circumstances  with  which  we 
now  have  to  deal.     The  formation  of  the  Union  was  a  conces- 


I  > 


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i\ 


i\ 


sion  to  it  of  powers  which  the  several  States  had  separately 
possessed,  and  chief  among  them  the  great  one  of  collecting 
import  duties.  In  parting  with  this, — which  some  of  them  did 
only  because  the  formation  of  a  Union  would  otherwise  have 
fiuled, — they  surrendered  a  power  out  of  proportion  to  the  func- 
tion of  government  that  went  with  it.  The  general  govern- 
ment, unless  it  were  to  be  continually  at  war,  undertook  noth- 
ing for  the  States  proportionate  to  this  great  source  of  revenue. 
It  is  impracticable  here  to  go  into  details  as  to  this,  but  no  can- 
did student  ^f  the  case  can  fail  to  see  its  essential  significance. 
The  general  government  maintains  the  (small)  army,  the  (un- 
important) navy,  the  foreign  ministers  and  consuls,  the  light- 
houses, and  such  part,  usually  small,  of  the  expense  of  the 
postal  system  as  is  not  defrayed  directly  by  those  who  use  it 
Besides  these  functions,  its  return  to  the  people,  in  govern- 
mental service,  is  small.  But  to  the  States  and  their  sub-divi- 
sions is  left  the  great  list  of  services  that  are  vital  to  the  social 
£ibric.  It  is  they  who  provide  the  machinery  for  the  admin- 
istration of  justice,  civil  and  criminal,  in  all  ordinary  cases; 
they  maintain  the  militia;  they  maintain  quarantine,  and  guard 
the  public  health ;  they  provide  the  jails,  hospitals,  asylums, 
and  other  institutions,  penal  and  benevolent ;  they  lay  out  and 
keep  up  the  highways;  they  maintain  bodies  of  police,  and 
wherever  their  people  have  gathered  into  towns  and  cities, 
they  supply  water  and  other  comforts  and  conveniences  of  civ- 
ilized municipal  life.  Moreover,  to  all  this  they  add  the  per- 
formance of  a  duty  upon  which  the  very  existence  of  the  na- 
tion depends :  — the  education  of  those  who  are  to  be,  when 
educated,  the  nation's  citizens.  All  these  are  functions  that 
reach  the  daily  life  of  the  people.  They  are  those  which  must 
be  honestly  done,  at  serious  cost.  To  pay  for  them  requires 
revenues  which  the  States,  the  counties,  the  cities,  the 
towns,  and  townships  must  draw  from  their  people  directly. 
The  general  government's  work,  in  time  of  peace,  is  light  in 
comparison.  Yet  it  has  the  easy  and  unfelt  revenues.  It  col- 
lects import  duties,  and  taxes  on  liquors  and  tobacco,  while 


the  States  must  assess  and  re-assess  the  people  for  their  houses, 
and  lands,  and  personal  savings. 

It  was  in  no  small  degree  the  appreciation  of  this  state  of 
facts  which  prompted  the  first  great  measure  of  relief  from  the 
general  to  the  separate  treasuries.  When  the  States'  debts 
were  assumed  by  the  Nation,  in  1789,  it  was  because  of  the 
evidence  that  its  back  was  broader  than  theirs.  It  had  revenue 
powers  altogether  disproportionate  to  theirs.  Had  it  been 
otherwise,  the  measure  would  not  have  been  adopted.  The 
whole  spirit  and  substance  of  Hamilton's  heroic  procedure  was 
derived  from  his  understanding  of  the  relative  shares  of  revenue 
power  and  governmental  function  which  the  States  and  the 
Union  had  taken  under  the  federal  system. 

Half  a  century  later,  the  situation  recurred.  The  nation's 
power  of  revenue  had  filled  her  treasury  more  than  full,  while 
the  States  were  struggling  with  inadequate  revenues  to  perform 
those  duties  which  had  been  left  in  their  care.  Debts  they  had, 
but  not  railways  or  canals.  Children  thev  had,  but  not  schools 
or  teachers.  The  surplus  distribution  of  1836,  wisely  con- 
ceived, and  honorable  to  the  leaders  of  both  parties  in  Congress 
who  carried  it  through,  was  a  simple  recognition  of  the  same 
state  of  facts  that  had  been  so  evident  at  the  beginning  of  the 
national  era.  It  was  a  measure  of  statesmanlike  justice,  for 
jt  transferred  to  the  local  treasuries  of  the  people  such 
part  of  their,  the  same  people's,  money  as  was  not  then  needed 
in  the  general  treasury.  So,  it  recognized  the  unity  of 
the  Nation,  and  repudiated  the  conventional  and  mischievous 
notion  that  the  general  sy  stem  is  one  foreign  to,  and  absolutely 
separated  from,  the  individualit)'^  of  the  States.  In  whatever 
degree  the  distribution  of  183^^  failed  of  its  full  usefulness, — 
and  the  instances  of  failure  have  been  absurdly  magnified  in 
the  interest  of  small  notions  and  preconceived  ♦^heories, — it  was 
a  failure  due  in  large  part  to  the  circumstances  of  the  time. 
The  wild-cat  banks  of  fifty  years  ago  are  no  more  behind  us- 
than  are  such  forms  of  fiscal  imprudence  as  characterized  the 
few  cases  in  which  the  distributed  sums  failed  of  a  good  use. 


u 


i 


10 


.  I 


I 


w 


The  situation,  now,  reproduces  the  essential  conditions  of 
1789  and  1836.  Again  are  the  separate  treasuries  weaker  ihan 
the  demands  upon  them :  again  is  the  general  treasury  able, 
if  not  willing,  to  help  them.  Can  this  be  reasonably  denied  ? 
Are  not  many  States  deeply  in  debt  ?  Have  not  some  of  them 
declared  their  obligations  beyond  their  ability  to  pay  ?  Is  it 
not  true  that  in  a  large  part  of  the  Union  the  educational  work 
which  the  Union's  welfare  requires  is  desperately  in  arrears  ? 
Will  any  one  deny  that  in  every  State  the  penal  methods 
require  great  improvement,  while  in  some  they  are  yet  to  be 
redeemed  from  actual  barbarity  ?  The  figures  of  the  Census, 
common  to  every  one's  use,  testify  upon  all  these  points,  and  have 
been  cited  again  and  again.  Ignorance  gains  upon  education, 
State  debts  are  scaled  down,  "convict  camps  "  are  kept  instead 
of  prisons  and  reformatories,  and  the  great  cities,  staggering 
under  their  work  of  providing  good  ways,  efficient  police,  pure 
water  and  healthful  conditions,  accumulate  debts  that  in  the 
aggregate  rival  that  of  the  Nation.*  It  may  be  said  with 
truth  that  while  the  evidence  of  the  faithful  purpose  of  the  peo- 
ple to  support  the  organization  of  society  has  raised  our  credit 
above  that  of  the  untried  and  unknown  conditions  of  1789,  the 
actual  difficulties  of  the  States  in  discharging  their  greatly 
more  complex  and  costly  duties  are  substantially  as  great  now 
as  they  were  when  Hamilton's  statemanship  came  to  their 
relief 

The  essential  truth  of  these  statements  is  matter  of  public 
knowledge.  Is  not  the  logical  consequence  of  them  as  plain  ? 
Is  it  not  clearly  suggested  by  the  very  nature  of  the  case  that 
permanently  if  possible,  but  certainly  during  the  interval  of 
1887-91,  the  Surplus  in  the  Washington  treasury  should  be 
justly  and  prudently,  but  also  openly  and  directly,  applied  to 

•While  the  national  debt  was  being  paid  ofT,  through  the  great  revenues  of  the 
Nation,  the  State  and  local  indebtedness,  fed  upon  small  and  hard-got  revenues,  was 
increased.  The  Census  of  1870  stated  the  total  of  State,  County,  City  and  Town 
debt  at  $868,676,758.  The  Census  of  1880  reported  the  same  to  be  Jli, 056, 406208.  And 
while  the  nation  borrows  at  3  per  cent.,  with  ease,  over  three-fourths  of  the  local  bonds 
bore  interest  of  5  per  cent,  and  upward. 


wmm 


the  relief  of  the  people's  burdens  of  State  debt  and  expenditure  ? 
Do  we  fail  to  see  that  the  people  in  the  States  separately  are 
the  identical  people  of  the  States  united,  and  do  we  decline  to 
employ  for  their  benefit  all  the  available  means  of  revenue 
relief,  whether  these  may  proceed  from  the  National  systsm  or 
from  the  system  of  the  States  ? 

To  omit  this  conservation  of  the  strength  of  the  American 
people  is  to  place  ourselves  at  a  disadvantage  in  comparison 
with  other  countries.  It  must  handicap  us  in  the  world's  race. 
If  we  are  to  maintain  our  condition,  and  achieve  further  advance- 
ment, it  must  be  by  a  careful  use  of  all  our  powers,  and  not  by 
the  waste  of  any.  If  our  conception  of  the  political  relation  of 
the  States  to  the  Union  is  such  that,  because  of  it,  we  must 
oblige  the  people  to  sacrifice  some  of  their  most  important  re- 
sources, then  the  merit  and  the  strength  of  the  Federal  System 
in  comparison  with  that  of  other  systems  of  organization  has 
been  altogether  misconceived,  and  in  the  long  run  the  price 
paid  for  it  must  prove  too  high. 

There  might  be  objections  to  the  plan  of  using  the  Surplus 
for  State  and  local  relief,  if  the  facts  of  the  case  were  different, 
(i)  If  it  would  diminish  local  courage  and  intelligence,  by  a 
dangerous  centralization  of  function,  that  would  be  an  objection 
of  the  most  serious  character.  But,  on  the  contrary,  it  w  >uld 
have  the  effect  of  supporting  the  local  functions  and  enabling 
them  to  be  more  efficiently  performed.  Is  it  thought  that  when 
these  are  better  done  they  will  be  less  esteemed  ?  (2)  If  Dis- 
tribution would  make  the  States  look  entirely  to  the  national 
treasury  for  their  resources,  that  would  be  an  objection.  But 
there  is  no  such  probability.  If  the  entire  Surplus  were  preserved, 
if  no  revenues  were  cut  off",  if  the  cancellation  of  the  national 
debt  were  not  resumed,  the  excess  of  the  national  treasury 
would  not,  according  to  our  present  experience,  form  one-third 
of  the  annual  amount  now  required  to  be  raised  by  taxation 
from  the  people,  on  State,  county,  city,  and  other  local  account* 

*  The  Census  of  1880  placed  this  taxation  annually  at  $312,750,721.  Since 
then,  it  has,  of  course,  largely  increased. 

12 


It  is  to  be  hoped  thai  even  the  most  timid  will  be  totally  with- 
out fear  of  a  cessation  of  the  tax-collector's  visits.  For  a  long 
perirKl  to  come  they  will  be  made  to  feel  the  reality  of  the  local 
orj;^izations,  by  the  need  of  putting  their  hands  in  their  pockets. 
(3)  If  the  United  States  had  entirely  canceled  its  debt,  and  had 
not  the  prospect  of  any  future  use  for  the  present  excess  of 
revenue,  the  proposal  of  Distribution  might  seem  to  some  degree 
weakened.  But  a  great  debt  yet  exists,  and  a  fourth  of  it  will  be 
redeemable  in  1891.  (4)  If  the  revenues  from  which  the  Sur- 
plus arises  were  burdensome  and  injurious;  if  their  mainten- 
ance discouraged  good  morals  or  depressed  the  national  strength, 
the  preservation  and  use  of  the  Surplus  would  be  less  reason- 
able. But,  as  has  been  shown,  the  precise  opposite  is  the  truth. 
To  repeal  the  sugar  duty  will  be  purely  a  fiscal  measure,  scarcely 
felt  by  anyone,  while  the  repeal  of  the  taxes  on  intoxicants, 
in  part  or  entirely,  would  be  simply  to  make  them  cheaper  to 
the  consumer.  (5)  If  the  States  and  local  systems  were  suf- 
ficiently supplied,  or  if  their  revenues  were  easily  derived,  the 
case  would  be  different.  But  they  are,  as  has  been  said,  ill 
supplied,  and  in  possession  only  of  the  most  onerous  revenues. 
(6)  If  there  was  nothing  which  the  States  desired  to  do,  and 
would,  by  timely  support  from  the  national  excess,  be  enabled 
to  do,  the  case  would  be  different.  But  it  surely  would  be  well 
for  them  to  pay  their  debts  ;  to  keep  faith  with  their  creditors ;  to 
redeem  their  coupons  instead  of  passing  laws  to  "  kill  "  them ;  to 
estabhsh  education  that  will  outrun  illiteracy ;  and  to  improve 
their  penal  and  benevolent  functions  beyond  the  present  mark. 
These  are  results  which  are  worth  accomplishing,  unless  it  be 
true  that  Bankruptcy  is  preferable  to  Solvency,  Ignorance  to 
Culture,  and  Barbarism  to  Humanity. 

Referring,  in  conclusion  of  this  subject,  to  some  of  its 
strictly  fiscal  aspects,  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  a  Protective 
Tariff"  is  not  a  measure  devised  (or  revenue  purposes.  The  du- 
ties being  hiid  to  protect,  their  result  in  revenue  cannot  be  cer- 
tain; it  must  vary  from  year  to  year,  according  as  imports 
increase  or  decline.     No  man  can  say  in  advance  what  their 


precise  return  will  be,  a  year  hence ;  no  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury, using  his  best  powers  of  judgment,  can  estimate  within  an 
average  annual  variation  of  twenty  millions  of  dollars.  It  fol- 
lows that  since  assurance  must  be  made  of  an  ample  income, 
there  will  be  almost  certainly  a  considerable  excess,  year  by 
year,  and  it  is  evident  that  to  prevent  this  from  working  public 
injury,  there  must  be  some  way  provided  to  return  it  regularly 
and  punctually  to  the  channels  of  trade.  It  must  be  recalled 
that  the  country  has  never  yet  had  any  prolonged  experience 
with  a  Protective  Tariff,  except  when  there  was  a  large  amount 
of  redeemable  debt  upon  which  to  employ  the  excess  revenue ; 
and  it  seems  not  too  much  to  say,  judging  from  the  obvious 
circumstances  of  the  case,  that  when  duties  are  imposed  with 
the  protective  purpose,  there  must  be  some  permanent  provi- 
sion by  which  the  redundancy  resulting  from  them  shall  be 
employed.  While  the  public  debt  remains,  and  there  are 
bonds  redeemable,  this  outlet  answers  the  full  purpose,  but 
there  will  be  times,  as  at  present,  when  bonds  are  not  redeem- 
able. 

In  any  transfer  from  the  general  to  the  separate  treas- 
uries, provision  of  law  as  to  the  purposes  and  manner  of  apply- 
ing the  funds  should  of  course  be  made.  The  States  should 
probably  be  required  to,  first,  settle  overdue  interest ;  second,  to 
pay  overdue  debt ;  third,  to  relieve  taxation,  in  such  manner  as 
they  may  see  fit  The  excess  in  the  national  treasury,  at  the 
end  of  each  fiscal  year,  should  be  officially  ascertained  and  de- 
clared, and,  under  the  general  law  regulating  the  matter,  it 
should  be  apportioned  upon  a  uniform  basis,  and  at  a  fixed  date 
paid  over.  The  States  would  use  these  funds  when  received, 
and  in  any  time  of  waiting  for  an  appropriation  act  of  the 
Legislatures,  they  would  be,  as  State  funds  almost  uniformly 
are,  on  deposit  in  the  banks^  available  for  the  business  uses  of 
the  community. 

Such  a  process  would  be  an  accompanying  safe-guard  to 
a  system  of  revenues  derived  from  protective  duties.  It  would 
make  a  surplus  not  objectionable  but  useful,  and  no  longer  a 

14 


temptation  to  wasteful  and  extravagant  expenditures  by  Con- 
gress. There  would  be,  indeed,  a  powerful  persuasive  to  dis- 
creet and  economical  appropriations,  in  the  desire  of  each 
community  to  have  its  debts  lifted,  and  its  taxation  lightened 


*S 


" 


II. 

TV /r  OST  important  and  most  obvious  among  the  reasons  which 
favor  a  complete  reciprocity  of  trade  with  Canada,  is  the 
advantage  which  will  accrue  to  both  countries  from  the  increase 
of  the  markets  for  their  respective  products.  We  shall  be  ad- 
mitted to  Canada ;  the  Canadians  to  the  United  States.  Their 
country  is  one  of  colder  climate  than  ours,  its  products  are  there- 
fore different,  and  its  markets  call  for  other  products  than  those 
which  its  own  soil  affords.  The  supply  of  this  demand  is  a 
legitimate  commerce.  Interchange  of  commodities  between 
countries  so  situated  is  a  movement  of  nature.  And  in  this 
case  its  naturalness  is  increased  by  the  configuration  of  the 
border  line.  The  Canadian  provinces  impinge  upon  the 
United  States  much  more  than  they  do  upon  each  other. 
They  lie  in  groups,  each  of  which  has  its  closest  geographical 
relations,  not  with  the  other  groups,  but  with  the  adjoining  part 
of  this  country.  The  Maritime  Provinces  find  their  counter- 
part in  Maine;  Quebec  and  Ontario  join  upon  New  Hampshire, 
Vermont,  New  York  and  Michigan;  while  Manitoba  and  the 
Canadian  Northwest  is  the  trade  associate  of  Minnesota,  and 
our  Territories  westward  to  the  Pacific.  Interchange  across  the 
line,  between  these  closely  joined  regions,  is  as  natural  as  the 
flow  of  rivers,  and  whatever  may  be  done  to  check  it,  and  to 
force  a  trade  movement  east  and  west  through  Canada,  passing 
from  one  to  the  other  of  its  severed  groups,  is  done  against 
the  physical  laws  of  their  situation  and  interest. 

In  view  of  this,  the  burden  of  the  present  system  c  *"  custom- 
house barriers,  by  which  Canada  repels  our  trade,  and  we,  on 
our  part  repel  hers,  becomes  unreasonable.  Here  is  not  only 
one  line,  but  actually  huo  lines,  of  custom-houses,  and  customs 
officers,  maintained  along  the  enormous  stretch   of  territory 

i6 


frcim  the  /  tlantic  to  the  Pacific.  For  nearly  four  thousand 
miles  this  mutual  repulsion  is  set  up.  That  it  is  costly  to 
each  nation  is  evident ;  that  it  can  be  entirely  effective  is  im- 
possible. And  as  the  population  on  each  side  of  the  boundary 
increases,  and  especially  as  trade  centres  grow  up  in  the  vast 
region  west  of  the  great  Lakes,  it  will  become  a  task  beyond 
the  ability  of  either  government  to  effectually  guard  the  line. 

In  addition  to  these  permanent  reasons,  a  special  one  of 
great  force  and  urgency  presents  itself  This  is  the  necessity 
of  settling  the  Fisheries  Question.  If  peace  between  the  two 
countries  is  to  be  preserved, — as  certainly  we  all  desire  it  shall 
be, — the  complications  of  the  fisheries  business  must  be  ad- 
justed. It  is  conceded  that,  since  the  right  of  fishing  was  par- 
titioned, a  century  ago,  when  by  the  treaty  of  1783,  the  United 
States  ceased  to  be  in  the  same  political  community  with 
Canada,  no  arrangement  of  the  separate  use  of  the  right  has 
been  either  lasting  or  satisfactory.  The  history  of  the  whole 
business  is  one  of  continual  dispute,  coming  at  last  to  the 
present  dead-lock  of  diplomacy.  But  Commercial  Union  will  dis- 
pose of  the  Fisheries  quarrel,  finally  and  conclusively.  If  we 
reestablish  a  common  relationship  to  the  fishing  grounds  for 
the  fishermen  of  both  countries,  the  difficulty  will  be  solved, 
and  the  solution  will  be  as  simple  and  peaceful  as  it  is  just  and 
permanent.  Moreover,  the  evidence  thus  afforded  of  the  value 
of  Commercial  Union  reaches  much  farther  than  to  the  one 
case.  What  it  will  do  for  our  present  controversy  over  the 
Fisheries  it  will  do  as  well  for  other  causes  of  controversy. 
It  will  compose  the  difficulties  that  are  in  existence,  and  it  will 
obviate  those  that,  under  our  present  system  of  unfriendly 
interests,  are  certain  to  develop.  If  it  effected  but  the  one  re- 
sult it  would  be  a  most  desirable  measure ;  its  promise  of 
effecting  all  results  of  the  like  nature  makes  it  worth  our  most 
energetic  endeavor. 

That  the  proposal  of  Commercial  Union  must  be  appre- 
ciated in  Canada,  it  is  easy  to  see.  The  natural  separation  of 
the  Dominion  provinces   into    groups,   and   the  difficulty   of 

17 


forcing  their  trade  into  an  east  and  west  channel,  are  causes 
which  continually  manifest  their  unsatisfactory  results  in  Cana- 
dian discussion.  The  Maritime  Provinces  desire  commerce 
v/ith  New  England,  as  nature  intended  they  should  have; 
while  at  the  other  extreme  Manitoba  is  demandmg  that  she  be 
permitted  her  natural  outlet  for  her  crops  southward  through 
the  Red  River  valley  tc  Dakota,  and  the  great  mills  and  mar- 
kets of  Minnesota.  So,  too,  Ontario  desires  trade  with  the  ad- 
joining states  of  our  Union,  populous  and  rich,  and  teeming 
with  markets  for  her  produce;  while  Quebec  chafes  under  the 
restrictions  that  the  present  a,  t'ficial  and  arbitrary  arrangements 
impose  upon  her.  These  are  facts,  it  is  true,  which  concern 
Canada,  and  which  her  own  statesmen  must  deal  with ;  but 
they  are  none  the  less  germane,  as  proof  of  the  one  great  fact 
that  the  movement  of  commerce  across  the  present  boundary 
line  of  the  two  countries  is  that  suggested  by  nature,  and  that 
restriction  upon  this  should  be  imposed  only  for  the  strongest 
of  reasons.  The  chafing  of  each  group  in  the  Dominion  over 
the  compulsion  of  its  trade  east  and  west,  and  the  repression 
of  it  north  and  south,  testifies  against  what  is  arbitrary  and 
wasteful  in  favor  of  what  is  natural  and  beneficial. 

The  proposed  arrangement  commends  itself  to  the  ap- 
proval of  both  classes  of  economists,  in  the  two  countries.  It 
may  very  well  be  accepted  by  both.  Those  who  desire  free- 
dom of  trade  see  in  this  a  step  by  which  the  area  of  unrestrict- 
ed trade  will  be  enlarged.  On  the  other  hand.  Protectionists 
perceive  that  if  the  two  countries  agree  with  each  other  for  the 
common  maintenance  of  the  protective  system  the  stability  of 
that  policy  in  each  must  be  all  the  more  assured.  For  the 
friends  of  Protection  in  the  United  States  acceptance  of  Com- 
mercial Union  was  made  possible  when  Canada,  in  1879, 
adopted  her  tariffs,  and  protected  her  manufactures  against 
those  of  other  countries,  even  including  Great  Britain.  That 
step  assimilated  the  policy  of  Canada  to  that  of  the  United 
States,  and  gave  the  two  a  like  position  and  interest.  With  the 
ports  of  Canada  open  to  the  wares  of  Europe,  our  customs 

18 


line  along  her  border,  however  costly  and  burdensome,  was  a 
necessity ;  but  with  her  ports  protected,  the  fiCedoni  of  the 
boundary  between  us  has  become  both  prudent  and  easy.  To 
remove  the  custom-houses  will  be  to  mutually  strengthen  both 
countries,  adding  to  the  protected  markets  of  the  one  the  pi  o- 
tected  markets  of  the  other,  to  be  profitably  enjoyed  by  the 
diversified  products  of  each.  We  shall  receive  from  Canada 
her  store  of  timber,  prepared  by  Nature  for  civilized  uses ;  we 
shall  receive,  when  our  crops  of  agricultural  products  are  de- 
ficient, the  excess  of  those  from  Canada,  without  their  co.st  be- 
ing increased  to  the  consumer.  The  coal  of  Nova  Scotia  may 
then  reach  New  England,  at  the  lowest  cost,  while  any  loss  to 
our  mines  of  this  trade  will  be  made  up  by  shipments  of  our 
coal  into  Ontario  and  the  Northwest.  Unquestionably,  it  will 
afford  our  manufacturers  of  many  lines  of  goods  an  increased 
market  in  Canada,  while  it  will  leave  to  that  country  the  secure 
growth  of  those  manufacturing  industries  that  enjoy  advantages 
of  location,  or  that  are  especially  adapted  to  Canadian  con- 
ditions. 

All  the  conditions  make  Commercial  Union  a  fit  and  ap- 
propriate measure.  If  they  were  different  it  would  not  be  such. 
If  the  two  countries  did  not  closely  and  naturally  adjoin ;  if 
they  lay  in  the  same  belt,  and  competed  with  each  other  for  the 
disposition  of  the  same  products;  if  they  were  of  different  ranks 
in  civilization  ;  if  they  differed  materially  in  their  standard  of 
social  condition;  if  they  held  variant  theories  as  to  the  proper 
status  of  the  laboring  people  ;  if  they  had  divergent  laws,  or 
characteristics,  or  usages  of  trade — in  any  or  all  these  circum- 
stances, the  argument  for  complete  freedom  of  interchange 
would  fail.  But  the  actual  circumstances  favor  it  at  every  point. 
The  conditions  existing  are  in  all  essential  particulars  the  re- 
verse of  those  which  would  make  the  measure  unfit. 

No  principle  of  the  national  policy  prevailing  in  the  two 
countries  is,  if  properly  considered,  inimical  to  Commercial 
Union.  As  has  been  said,  the  agreement  to  maintain  a  common 
Tariff  will  necessarily  stiffen  and  sustain  the  policy  of  protective 

19 


f 


i: 


duties  in  each.  And  there  is  nothing  in  the  doctrine  of  Pro- 
tection which  demands  a  restriction  upon  trade  that  docs  not 
strengthen  tfie  country  employing  it.  If  the  time  be  opportune 
and  the  circumstances  favorable  for  establishing  with  Canada  a 
new  and  beneficial  relation  of  trade  it  would  be  a  misuse  of  the 
Protective  theory  to  employ  it  as  an  argument  in  opposition. 

It  is  not  needful  to  discuss  here  all  the  details  which  should 
enter  into  the  agreement  between  the  two  countries.  Some  of 
them  niay  be  difiRcult  of  adjustment ;  but  all  will  yield,  beyond 
a  doubt,  to  a  sincere  effort  at  agreement.  Nor  is  it  necessary 
to  consider  what  advantages  Canada  may  expect  to  gain,  which 
must  particularly  influence  her  in  favor  of  the  measure.  We 
need  only  to  know, — what  is  now  the  fact, — that  the  Canadian 
people  favorably  regard  the  proposal,  and  that  they  arc  certain 
to  respond  in  a  friendly  temper  to  an  overture  from  the 
United  States  for  a  serious  and  careful  consideration  of  its 
possibility.  We  cannot  expect  them  to  urge  it  upon  us ;  it  will 
be  quite  enough  if  we  find  them,  as  we  certainly  shall,  respon- 
sive to  our  offer  of  a  negotiation  upon  the  subject.  Never 
before  were  the  circumstances  more  propitious,  and  never  be- 
fore was  it  so  desirable,  for  the  special  as  for  the  general  reasons 
which  have  been  recited,  to  effect  this  great  reform  in  the  trade 
relations  of  the  two  countries. 

To  attempt  once  more  to  deal  with  the  Fisheries  Question 
in  the  way  which  has  been  found  by  the  experience  of  more 
than  a  century  to  be  unavailing  or  would  seem  scarcely  worth  the 
serious  thought  of  statesmen.  To  deal  with  it  on  broader 
ground,  upon  principles  whose  application  would  resolve  all 
difficulties  of  the  like  character,  must  surely  commend  itself  to 
every  mind.  There  should  be  no  piece-meal  bargaining  over 
the  fishing  and  the  fish;  the  interests  involved  should  find  a 
solution  of  all  their  difficulties  in  the  larger  way.  Nor  is  it 
possible  for  the  United  States  to  consider  again  the  one-sided 
and  injurious  schemes  of  partial  reciprocity  which  have  twice 
heretofore  been  employed.  If  we  are  to  have  reciprocity  at 
all,  it  must  be  made  just  to  both  sides,  and  give  to  each  countiy 
the  opportunity  of  getting  the  full  benefit  of  an  equitable  free- 
dom of  trade  with  the  other. 


20 


le  of  Pro- 
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;h  should 

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lin,  which 
ure.     We 
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Nor  is  it 
Dne-sided 
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ible  free- 


